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Decisions about climate change are inherently moral. They require making moral judgements 14 
about important values and the desired state of the present and future world. Hence there are 15 
potential benefits in explaining climate action by integrating well-established and emerging 16 
knowledge on the role of morality in decision-making. Insights from the social and 17 
behavioural sciences can help ground climate change decisions in empirical understandings 18 
of how moral values and worldviews manifest in people and societies. Here, we provide an 19 
overview of progress in research on morals in the behavioural and social sciences, with an 20 
emphasis on empirical research. We highlight the role morals play in motivating and framing 21 
climate decisions; outline work describing morals as relational, situated, and dynamic; and 22 
review how uneven power dynamics between people and groups with multiple moralities 23 
shape climate decision-making. Effective and fair climate decisions require practical 24 
understandings of how morality manifests to shape decisions and action. To this end, we aim 25 
to better connect insights from social and behavioural scholarship on morality with real-26 























1. Introduction   50 
 51 
 52 
Decisions about climate change are inherently moral; the integrity of our planet and the 53 
wellbeing of its inhabitants are at stake. Climate decision-making thus requires making moral 54 
judgements about the sort of world each of us wants (Paavola and Adger, 2006; Byskov et 55 
al., 2019; Pelling and Garschagen, 2019). The gamut of moral climate change decisions is 56 
wide and deep; virtually all decisions about the allocation and use of resources and labour 57 
have an impact on the carbon cycle and ultimately on human-induced climate change. 58 
Decisions on how to allocate resources in the face of climate change affect people and the 59 
non-human world differentially, highlighting priorities and values at risk. As such, climate 60 
decisions include all ‘decisions leading to actions that have consequences for climate change, 61 
particularly through mitigation and adaptation’ (Orlove et al., 2020, p. 2). Thus, climate 62 
decisions span geographical, administrative and epistemological scales from individual 63 
consumption, to national strategies, to binding global commitments.  64 
 65 
The moral dimensions of climate change decisions are twofold. First, there are substantive 66 
dilemmas about burdens of responsibility for mitigation and widely uneven climate impacts 67 
on current and future generations. This normative dimension has traditionally been the remit 68 
of climate ethics, that has mapped the contours of moral arguments about the distribution of 69 
rights, duties, responsibilities, costs and consequences of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 70 
(Müller, 2001; Roberts and Parks, 2006; Mattoo and Subramanian, 2012). These insights 71 
further highlight moral imperatives to minimize risk and impacts of weather extremes on 72 
marginalized and vulnerable populations (Pearce et al., 2010; Watts et al., 2015). Climate 73 
ethics outlines principles of corrective or restorative justice (Grasso, Marco; Vladimirova, 74 
2020; Robinson and Carlson, 2021), and demonstrate issues around the limits of 75 
representation—how non-present human actors such as the powerless or yet un-born, or the 76 
natural world are taken into account (Antadze, 2019; Tschakert, 2020). Climate ethics hence 77 
offers theoretically guided, normative principles, such as the precautionary principle, to guide 78 
decisions.  79 
 80 
Second, climate decisions require actors—including individuals, policymakers, societies and 81 
higher governance bodies—to navigate everyday moral worldviews that shape the context, 82 
character and limits of decision-making itself. Decisions take place within, and often seek to 83 
change, existing moral norms, intuitions, and values. The social and behavioural sciences 84 
empirically investigate how moral context, worldviews, and identities shape and constrain 85 
how decision are made and enacted. They explore how decisions manifest in practice, and 86 
whether they lead to enduring change. Thus, findings from across the social and behavioural 87 
sciences can help adjudicate whether decisions are practical and feasible. They are 88 
particularly important at the ‘messy middle’, where decisions made at higher levels—for 89 
example, global policy—are translated and enacted on the ground (Goldberg, Gustafson and 90 
van der Linden, 2020).  91 
 92 
Alongside engagement with substantive moral issues, effective and fair climate decisions 93 
require practical understanding of how morality manifests to shape decisions and action. Put 94 
simply, ‘if we are to succeed in bending the moral arc of history toward climate justice – to 95 
remake the world as it ought to be – we need to do a better job of working with the world as 96 
it is’ (Storey, 2019, p. 39). Indeed, there are growing calls to better include the pragmatic 97 
insights offered by empirical research in debates about climate ethics. Those who understand 98 
climate ethics as ‘normative theorizing about climate change’ (Green and Brandstedt, 2020, 99 
p. 1) are seeking to connect theory with methods that engage society (Bell, Swaffield and 100 
Peeters, 2019), and to consider the normative implications that empirical research raises for 101 
justice principles in climate ethics (Storey, 2019). Others identify a nascent and ‘as-of-yet 102 
amorphous field of multidisciplinary climate ethics’ (Grasso and Markowitz, 2015, p. 473), 103 
which builds on solid normative theorizing, but also incorporates psychological, sociological, 104 
political and economic research (Markowitz, Grasso and Jamieson, 2015). Insights from 105 
these fields contribute to real-world climate change decisions by ensuring that research is 106 
meaningful and useful given institutional and political constraints.  107 
 108 
In this paper, we aim to contribute to an ongoing debate about how practical and empirical 109 
social and behavioural sciences can inform multidisciplinary climate ethics (Bell, Swaffield 110 
and Peeters, 2019; Green and Brandstedt, 2020) and better connect scholarship to real world 111 
climate change decision-making (Markowitz, Grasso and Jamieson, 2015). In this review, we 112 
synthesize progress in the social and behavioural sciences that is relevant—directly and 113 
indirectly—across the gamut of climate change decisions. We include research directly aimed 114 
at climate change, such as on morals as motivations to act, and research with indirect but 115 
important implications for climate change decisions, including on decision context, and the 116 
character of decision-making itself. We highlight recent insights, lessons, and gaps across 117 
three themes: 1) the role of morals in motivating and framing climate decisions; 2) morals as 118 
relational, situated, and dynamic, and; 3) the uneven power dynamics of multiple moralities.  119 
Although these themes address moral framings and multiple moralities, they are distinct and 120 
emerge from diverse and sometimes siloed fields of research. Thus, rather than all-121 
encompassing, or mutually exclusive, these themes serve as a heuristic for organizing key 122 
insights. The approaches in the three main sections address the topics differently at different 123 
scales. First, social and behavioural insights into motivations and framings examine processes 124 
by individuals, embedded in social contexts. The second theme examines moralities as 125 
relational, culturally-specific and embedded in societal dynamics and institutions. The third 126 
theme involves critique of moral framings in governance and focuses on processes of 127 
eliciting and deliberating between moralities at higher policy and agenda-setting scales.  128 
 129 
2. Social and behavioural science insights   130 
 131 
 132 
2.1 The role of morals in motivating and framing climate decisions 133 
 134 
Morals may motivate and constrain climate decisions. A growing collection of empirical 135 
work on moral foundations, moral motivations and framing offers key insights for climate 136 
decisions. For instance, it is well established that people who perceive climate change to be a 137 
moral issue are more concerned about it (Grasso and Markowitz, 2015). There is, in addition, 138 
good evidence that public discourse in many world regions commonly articulates the pros 139 
and cons of climate change policies in moral terms (Adger, Butler and Walker-Springett, 140 
2017). Psychologists highlight the connection between people’s moral stances and attitudes 141 
to climate change (Wolsko, Ariceaga and Seiden, 2016) and show how the desire to maintain 142 
a group’s moral standing extends to action on climate change (Bain and Bongiorno, 2020). 143 
As such, there is considerable evidence that—rather than narrow economic arguments—144 
appeals to moral principles resonate more deeply and lead to better outcomes on climate 145 
change action (Corner and Randall, 2011; Bain and Bongiorno, 2020).  146 
 147 
Moral foundations theory, which has its origins in moral psychology, posits that people are 148 
primed to operate within a moral frame. People hold sets of distinct moral cognitive 149 
resources, termed moral foundations. These foundations include combinations of care and 150 
harm, fairness and cheating, loyalty and betrayal, authority and subversion, and sanctity and 151 
degradation (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2013). The combination and weight placed on a 152 
given moral foundation by an individual or society is based on culturally and historically 153 
specific institutions and technologies (Graham et al., 2011). For many indigenous peoples, 154 
for example, the maintenance of moral bonds of trust and reciprocity have been shown to be 155 
essential foundations of climate justice (Whyte, 2020). Moral foundations, through intuitions, 156 
are important in shaping people’s reactions, attitudes, and behaviour to climate change. For 157 
instance, moral values of compassion, fairness, and to a lesser extent, purity, are positive 158 
predictors of willingness to act on climate change in a study of lay public in the US 159 
(Dickinson et al., 2016). In contrast, in Australia, the moral imperative to maintain status quo 160 
is linked to climate scepticism (Rossen, Dunlop and Lawrence, 2015). 161 
 162 
There is growing evidence that people frame issues, including climate change, using specific 163 
moral foundations. Within a given society, ones’ moral foundations thus hold sway over both 164 
private and collective actions. For instance, some moral foundations stress the maintenance 165 
of social order and economic liberty (these often align with climate denialism) (Rossen, 166 
Dunlop and Lawrence, 2015), while others prioritise the moral imperative to address climate 167 
change, based on empathy and compassion for current and future affected peoples and 168 
ecosystems (Feinberg and Willer, 2013; Brown et al., 2019).  169 
 170 
In addition, people draw on different moral foundations depending on the type of climate 171 
decision at hand. Certain frames resonate with different policy interventions, and different 172 
moral publics; ‘the presence, absence, and even dominance of different moral framings have 173 
significant implications for the governance of adaptation’ to climate risks (Adger, Butler and 174 
Walker-Springett, 2017, p. 385). For example, when discussing adaptation policy choices 175 
people emphasize moral arguments about needs and ability to cope, but emphasize burden-176 
sharing when discussing mitigation (Klinsky, Dowlatabadi and Mcdaniels, 2012). In the UK, 177 
research has shown that when evaluating potential climate change adaptation options, people 178 
emphasize both moral concerns about individual vulnerability (solidarity, protection from 179 
harm, and fairness in burdens), and ‘issues of responsibility, of respect for and trust in 180 
authorities, and of doing the right thing by the country or for nature (sanctity, system 181 
preservation, and patriotism)’ (Adger, Butler and Walker-Springett, 2017, p. 383).  182 
 183 
Given the connection between moral foundations, motivations and types of climate decisions, 184 
how decisions are framed matters for legitimacy, individual behaviour and belief change. The 185 
moral framing of a decision shapes outcomes for people who support and advocate decisions 186 
(e.g., political groups), or make them (e.g., consumption choices). When people perceive 187 
their attitudes to be moral, they are more likely to act on them. For some, re-labelling 188 
attitudes and decisions in broad moral terms might help motivate and strengthen action 189 
(Luttrell et al., 2016). Research suggests that people who link the harmful consequences of 190 
climate change with people and things that they value (termed ‘objects of care’), have 191 
stronger responses to climate change, which promotes supports for climate change policy 192 
(Wang et al., 2018; Leviston and Walker, 2020). As such, framing climate change problems 193 
and impacts in ways that emphasize close ‘objects of care’ directly connected to individuals 194 
may help overcome moral disengagement with climate change (Leviston and Walker, 195 
2020). Emotions and empathy, including care, are the foundations of ‘moral judgments and 196 
principles that guide action’ (Jax et al., 2018, p. 23; see also McCaffree, 2019). Framing 197 
climate decisions as part of cultivating empathy and care thus may generate the moral 198 
impetus for action by ‘embed[ding] the environment and pro-environmental behaviour in 199 
place-oriented norms and institutions’ (Brown et al., 2019, p. 16). 200 
 201 
Reframing climate change decisions to align with an audience’s moral foundations is also a 202 
promising avenue for climate change decision-making. Research in psychology and climate 203 
communication suggests that climate decisions that are communicated in ways that align with 204 
people’s moral foundations shift behaviours, including when messages go against people’s 205 
political beliefs. For example, framings emphasize the way individuals treat one another. 206 
including fairness versus cheating and care versus harm. Framing can also intensify the 207 
environmentalism of people no matter their pre-existing environmental attitudes (Milfont, 208 
Davies and Wilson, 2019). Studies have found that moral reframing can change political 209 
groups’ pro-environmental behaviour (Feinberg and Willer, 2013; Sweetman and Whitmarsh, 210 
2016), recycling habits (Kidwell, Farmer and Hardesty, 2013), and climate change beliefs 211 
(Wolsko, Ariceaga and Seiden, 2016). Appealing to moral foundations associated with right-212 
wing political leanings (including loyality, authority, and sanctity) offers an avenue for 213 
making climate change morally relevant to a broader portion of society (Vainio and 214 
Makiniemi, 2016; Storey, 2019).  215 
 216 
Research on moral foundations and framing has accelerated and is opening up a number of 217 
research gaps and directions of particular relevance to climate change decision-making. First, 218 
there is only limited evidence on ‘which types of messages resonate in light of motivations 219 
and particular prior beliefs, values and identities’ (Druckman and McGrath, 2019, p. 117). 220 
Further research on how to effectively frame or translate climate change decisions to speak to 221 
more traditional and conservative moral worldviews, could help provide tools for diverse 222 
groups (from activists, and community leaders, to policymakers) to better communicate and 223 
encourage change. In concert, we need research on whether and how moral values motivate 224 
consistent moral behaviour and what internal and external barriers shape this (Nielsen and 225 
Hofmann, 2021). Finally, much work on moral motivations extends from moral psychology 226 
and moral neuroscience. Integrating this work into broader social sciences studies of moral 227 
identity and worldviews could provide novel insights for climate decision-making (Stets and 228 
Carter, 2012; Shadnam, 2020). The following section explores this contextual, relational view 229 
of morals in more detail.  230 
 231 
 232 
2.2 Morals as relational, situated, and dynamic 233 
 234 
 235 
A second key thread of research describes moral worldviews as relational and contextual. 236 
Broadly, research in this vein charts the ways that moral and ethical practices bound climate 237 
change decisions across all areas. A recent resurgence of interest in morality in sociology 238 
(Stets and Carter, 2012; Bargheer and Wilson, 2018; Bykov, 2019), anthropology (Mattingly 239 
and Throop, 2018), and geography (Barnett, 2013; Olson, 2015b, 2018) provides a number of 240 
insights relevant to climate decisions. These disciplines understand morality as culturally 241 
specific, embedded and embodied in the skills, habits, and institutions of daily life, and 242 
reinforced through practice (Barnett, 2013, p. 153). They examine how moral judgements, 243 
norms, and emotions manifest in everyday life (Cresswell, 2007; Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013; 244 
Olson, 2015b; Appel, 2019).  245 
 246 
Insights on the socially embedded nature of morality emphasize that moralities and 247 
institutions are co-constituted. For example, sociologists link inequalities in societies with 248 
socialized patterns of moral judgements; ‘morality binds societies together, forming the core 249 
of what it means to be part of a shared culture’ (Hitlin and Harkness, 2017, p. 5). People’s 250 
moral (or normative) worldviews on climate change mirror their position within class 251 
structures. For example, in Belgium, views on whether climate change can be solved through 252 
everyone cooperating (egalitarian), individuals acting responsibly (entrepreneurial), by 253 
governments and institutions (institutional) or as ultimately uncontrollable (fatalistic), map 254 
both to moral worldviews about other issues and onto social class (in this case defined as 255 
financial and cultural capital) (De Keere, 2020).  256 
 257 
Research on the connection between moral identity and self-worth points to the potential 258 
dangers of climate decisions (particularly about consumption) becoming overly and narrowly 259 
moralized. A relational approach to morals suggests that ‘moral views [are] simultaneously 260 
status markers and attempts to achieve self-worth’ (De Keere, 2020). Work in environmental 261 
sociology highlights how friendships and families transmit ecological values in ways that 262 
bolster or morally excuse individuals from pursuing sustainable practices (Jamieson, 2020). 263 
Thus, conditions and relationships play a role in producing morality; the context and social 264 
relations of a decision-maker (be they individual consumers or policymakers) will shape how 265 
they judge what is moral or not. Thus, where and how climate-decisions are made, and who 266 
the subjects are, will matter for how moral judgements ensue, and will thus shape decisions. 267 
For example, strong practice-based identities around cycling, veganism (Kurz et al., 2020), or 268 
producing zero waste (Bolderdijk, Brouwer and Cornelissen, 2018) may actually block 269 
broader societal shifts to sustainable practices because the ‘behaviour of “do-gooders” could 270 
be interpreted as a threat to onlookers’ moral self-concept’ (Kurz et al., 2020, p. 89). Rather 271 
than being encouraging, such “moralized minority practice identities” may stop people taking 272 
up sustainable practices (Kurz et al., 2020). Thus, organizations and governments seeking to 273 
encourage climate friendly practices, could ‘look to offer easy ways for people to experiment 274 
with a practice without having to first claim (or grapple with) an associated moralized 275 
identity’—for instance by advocating meat-free Mondays rather than becoming vegan (Kurz 276 
et al., 2020, p. 97).  277 
 278 
Moral worldviews and values are entwined with systems of production, consumption and 279 
markets across scales. Moral economy research provides a framework for understanding how 280 
markets are constituted and continually negotiated through moral ideas and practices across 281 
multiple economic scales, from micro (consumer’s lay normativity or moral reasoning), and 282 
meso (collective customs, discourses, and institutions through which groups moralize the 283 
market) to macro (state regulation of the economy) (Wheeler, 2019). This multiscale analysis 284 
of how markets and moralities are co-constituted (e.g., Zelizer, 2011) provides important 285 
ways to understand the solution space within moral economies of consumption and 286 
production. For climate decisions involving consumption (for instance, of energy or food), 287 
this framework offers a way to deepen an understanding of ‘why people choose to consume 288 
as they do and the values important to them’ (Wheeler, 2019, p. 277). Climate decisions 289 
seeking to change consumption and production may attend to different points of leverage 290 
across these scales. For instance, recent anthropological studies emphasize how energy 291 
consumption, use and production, including fossil fuels and renewables are part of ‘deeply 292 
held ethical worlds’ (Appel, 2019, p. 188). Relegating CO2 intensive industries as blanket 293 
‘bad’ or immoral misses the ‘rich ethical worlds that accrete around carbon-intensive energy 294 
sources’ (Appel, 2019, p. 182). Recognizing these ethical worlds as legitimate—and as a 295 
source of friction against climate transformations—may be a step towards productive 296 
discussion.  297 
 298 
Finally, research is beginning to explore how uncertainty and the prospects of irreversible 299 
loss create new types of moral judgements. Climate change creates unfamiliar situations—300 
climate shocks, climate change-related disasters, and uncertainty (Crosweller and Tschakert, 301 
2020)—and new experiences of grief wrought by ecological loss (Barnett et al., 2016; 302 
Tschakert et al., 2017; Cunsolo and Ellis, 2018). Climate change decision-makers at all scales 303 
will increasingly make decisions in and about new and uncertain situations. Sociological 304 
studies have shown that alongside moral identity (Stets and Carter, 2012; Shadnam, 2020), 305 
social relationships and changes in situations shape moral judgements and behaviour (Luft, 306 
2020). When faced with unfamiliar situations, people do not revert to the unconscious moral 307 
intuitions used in normal day-to-day situations. Instead, ‘what we believe to be good and bad 308 
gets a little fuzzier when we find ourselves in unfamiliar territory, and so we reconsider our 309 
relationships, and who and what truly matters’ (Luft, 2020, p. 2). This insight suggests that 310 
moral foundations (section 2.1) may be more dynamic in the face of unfamiliar decisions.  311 
 312 
Geographers emphasize that increasing urgency of action on climate change can serve to 313 
limit moral choices. As Olson argues ‘urgency is not just a variable, but actually produces the 314 
conditions for morality’ (Olson, 2015a, p. 519). For Olson, ‘urgency delimits human agency, 315 
such that by the time we choose to undertake any particular action on moral grounds, we 316 
assume it to be the only choice we have’ (ibid). Climate decisions are increasingly made in 317 
urgent situations; a critical research gap is understanding how this urgency delimits moral 318 
possibilities. Further research is warranted on how moral judgements might change 319 
depending on the context, including urgency, who they are about, and who makes them. The 320 
mode of decision-making also has an important influence on how morals might or might not 321 
be considered, and the extent to which they might be implicit or explicit.  322 
 323 
 324 
2.3 Power dynamics of multiple moralities 325 
 326 
 327 
Understanding how climate change decisions manifest in practice is important to ensure 328 
climate decisions do not produce perverse outcomes, and that future decisions are more 329 
equitable and effective. Environmental governance research has shown how interventions 330 
that aim to be neutral, apolitical, or merely technical, are implicitly moral (Li, 2007; Blythe et 331 
al., 2018; Nightingale et al., 2020) and has emphasized the power that these implicit moral 332 
framings have in climate governance (Morrison et al., 2017). Scholars have identified a 333 
narrow set of epistemological perspectives dominant in global climate change discourse 334 
(Castree et al., 2014), the risks that arise from apolitical framings of environmental change 335 
‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ (Blythe et al., 2018), and growing mistrust of prevailing climate 336 
change framings among communities in the Global South (Mahony, 2014; Miguel, Mahony 337 
and Monteiro, 2019). There are, in effect, contested meanings in climate change policy 338 
discourse and decision-making, whereby seemingly apolitical global climate knowledge is in 339 
fact ‘shaped by histories of exploration and colonialism, [… and] messy processes of linking 340 
scientific knowledge to decision-making within different polities’ (Mahony and Hulme, 341 
2018, p. 395). By extension, what counts as worth knowing, as a viable solution to climate 342 
change, and who and what counts as a moral subject (e.g., whose losses are considered when 343 
making decisions) are embroiled in complex power relations across scales from individuals to 344 
global negotiations (Castree et al., 2014; Tschakert et al., 2017, p. 10).   345 
 346 
Significant injustices are wrought by market-based tools and frameworks available and used 347 
in climate decisions and policies. As such, research in this area charts the boundaries of a 348 
pragmatic and fair climate solution space. Much critical discussion in environmental 349 
governance currently falls under the rubric of ‘environmentality’—building on Foucault’s 350 
original concept of ‘governmentality’—referring to the subtle ways that environmental 351 
behaviour is regulated through the development of new subjectivities, or new environmental 352 
values and moralities (Agrawal, 2005). There are a variety of environmentalities (Fletcher, 353 
2017; Asiyanbi, Ogar and Akintoye, 2019; Fletcher and Cortes-Vazquez, 2020), including the 354 
ways that local communities resist or adapt to new forms of environmental governance 355 
(Morrison et al., 2019). For instance, empirical work has critiqued the market-based focus of 356 
many climate tools and conceptual frameworks, such as REDD+, ecological modernization 357 
and carbon trading and offsetting (Knox-Hayes, 2015; Watt, 2018; Song et al., 2021), 358 
resonating with literature that explicitly critiques their morality (Caney, 2010). Knox-Hayes 359 
(2015), for example, shows how neoliberal approaches to environmental governance 360 
(including climate) ultimately reduce all values—including those of morality—to exchange 361 
value, ignoring their spatial and temporal characteristics.  362 
 363 
Alongside the opportunities moral framing holds for climate decisions (section 2.1), 364 
navigating multiple moral framings also holds challenges for governance. Multiple publics 365 
generate multiple moralities; it is often not possible to reconcile different frames. For 366 
instance, global mitigation actions, led by wealthier nations and privileged groups, can 367 
violate indigenous values of consent, trust, accountability, and reciprocity (Whyte, 2020). 368 
Indeed, pursuing a unitary ‘public morality’ risks obscuring diversity, and can be used to 369 
glibly rationalise certain climate policy choices (Hulme, 2020). Rather, because moral frames 370 
vary, ‘public morality’ must primarily be a procedural rather than substantive concept, where 371 
multiple moral publics are accounted for by ensuring the articulation of diverse values and 372 
interests in climate policy (Asen, 2003; Lane and Morrison, 2006).  373 
 374 
This emphasis on multiple rationalities has highlighted the interactions between 375 
environmental and climate governance strategies and the subjects of those strategies (e.g. 376 
McGregor et al., 2015; Malier, 2019), and has helped to investigate and interpret the gaps 377 
between the visions of climate decision-makers and the implementation of decisions on the 378 
ground (Collins, 2020; Fletcher and Cortes-Vazquez, 2020). In their discussion of REDD+ in 379 
Nigeria, for example, Asiyanbi et al., (2019) describe how it aimed to normalise particular 380 
moral values about forest protection but were countered by local discourses of morality 381 
centred around entitlements to forests. Others have shown how framings of climate solutions, 382 
for instance individualising moral narratives that situate climate change as the responsibility 383 
of individuals and consumer behaviour, deliberately shift the burden of response from states 384 
to citizens and thus justify minimal government action (Blythe et al., 2018; Jamieson, 2020).  385 
 386 
The mode of decision-making has an important influence on how morals might or might not 387 
be considered, and the extent to which they might be implicit or explicit. Given people’s 388 
diverse moralities, climate decision-making procedures should not aim to reach a certain 389 
moral ‘truth’ or underlying principle, but rather to encourage and facilitate democracy and 390 
incorporate multiple forms of knowledge and truth (Rorty, 1989; Hulme, 2020; Hulme et al., 391 
2020). Deliberative decision-making invites consideration of plural moralities, and has been 392 
used to address controversial issues hitherto deeply morally divisive (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 393 
2019). A Citizen’s Assembly has recently been convened in UK to advise the government on 394 
how it should develop policy to meet its (legally binding) zero net emissions by 2050 target 395 
(https://www.climateassembly.uk). Other opportunities to incorporate morals into climate 396 
decision-making at different scales include participatory scenarios and futuring exercises 397 
(O’Neill et al., 2014)—which have long been used by the private sector, and are becoming 398 
increasingly popular in public spherea—alongside the use of morally grounded tools to guide 399 
transformation processes (Grasso and Tàbara, 2019). 400 
 401 
Framings of problems and solutions can shut down parts of the ‘solution space’ for decision-402 
makers, namely what is politically feasible if a certain approach is outside a frame. For 403 
example, an analysis of press releases from organizations across the United States found that 404 
climate change was predominantly positioned as best handled through the expertise of 405 
scientific, political and economic institutions (Wetts, 2019, p. 25). This post-political framing 406 
that ‘neutralizes social and political power dynamics’ (Wetts, 2019, p. 1) can even dominated 407 
the rhetoric of advocacy organizations. These findings highlight the implications of framing 408 
beyond targeting and aligning to individual moral foundations (section 2.1); moral frames 409 
may limit decision-maker’s ability to interrogate interlinked causes of climate issues, and 410 
thereby narrow the range of possible solutions. For instance, leaders who are able to expand 411 
their remit of acceptable approaches to governing to include ethical elements like compassion 412 
and care, will be more successful in navigating transformation after disaster (Crosweller and 413 
Tschakert, 2020). Understanding the factors that impede decision-makers’ abilities to act on 414 
their moral duties to constituents, and how framings of climate change at higher governance 415 
scale limit climate change options are important areas of future research.   416 
 417 
Empirical explorations of the gaps between intention and outcome in climate governance 418 
suggest that static typologies for climate change decision-making downplay the complexity 419 
of lived moral values and the power struggles of whose perspectives matter (Tschakert et al., 420 
2017). Uncovering these implicit moral framings within climate change governance can thus 421 
help cultivate new, more socially and ecologically equitable forms of climate governance 422 
(Asiyanbi, Ogar and Akintoye, 2019). Such approaches include placing values and normative 423 
commitments from diverse backgrounds at the centre of climate change analysis and action 424 
(Castree et al., 2014; Nightingale et al., 2020), alongside a relational approach that allows 425 
local, dynamic values to be incorporated into climate decision-making (Tschakert et al., 426 
2017). In sum, the morality of climate decisions must be openly discussed and form part of 427 
the decision-making process itself.   428 
 429 
 430 
3. Conclusion  431 
 432 
Climate decisions concern many aspects of everyday life, and many moral junctures. Hulme 433 
argues that ‘wise governance of climate… emerges best when rooted in larger and thicker 434 
stories about human purpose, identity, duty, and responsibility’ (Hulme, 2020, p. 311). We 435 
contend that morality insights from social and behavioural sciences are key ‘thickening’ 436 
ingredients for climate change decision-makers. In this review, we have highlighted the role 437 
morals play in framing and motivating climate decisions, explored findings about morals as 438 
relational, situated, and dynamic, and reviewed how uneven power dynamics of multiple 439 
moralities shape climate decision-making. Our aim is to encourage climate decision-makers, 440 
and climate scholars broadly, to engage more closely with emerging insights from this 441 
scholarship. More broadly, this review serves as a first step to bringing sometimes 442 
inaccessible theoretical debates into conversation with what is possible and pragmatic given 443 
the social nature of climate change decision-making (Markowitz, Grasso and Jamieson, 444 
2015). This effort to synthesise insights relevant to a cohering—but nebulous—body of work 445 
in climate morality (Grasso and Markowitz, 2015) has inevitably skimmed over recent and 446 
relevant work. However, the studies gathered here serve to orient those engaged with climate 447 
decision-making and behaviour change, those working on the normative dimensions of 448 
climate problems, and those seeking to guide and influence climate decision-making as a 449 
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